The simplicity of deployment and perpetual operation of energy harvesting devices provides a compelling proposition for a new class of edge devices for the Internet of Things. In particular, Computational Radio Frequency Identification (CRFID) devices are an emerging class of battery free, computational, sensing enhanced devices that harvest all of their energy for operation. Despite wireless connectivity and powering, secure wireless firmware updates remains an open challenge for CRFID devices due to: intermittent powering, limited computational capabilities, and the absence of a supervisory operating system. We present, for the first time, a secure wireless code dissemination (SecuCode) mechanism for CRFIDs by entangling a device intrinsic hardware security primitive-Static Random Access Memory Physical Unclonable Function (SRAM PUF)-to a firmware update protocol. The design of SecuCode: i) overcomes the resource-constrained and intermittently powered nature of the CRFID devices; ii) is fully compatible with existing communication protocols employed by CRFID devices-in particular, ISO-18000-6C protocol; and ii) is built upon a standard and industry compliant firmware compilation and update method realized by extending a recent framework for firmware updates provided by Texas Instruments. We build an end-to-end SecuCode implementation and conduct extensive experiments to demonstrate standards compliance, evaluate performance and security.
I. INTRODUCTION
The exponential rate of hardware miniaturization, low cost and low power sensing modalities and rapid developments in communication technologies are driving the world towards a future where tiny scale computing will be more pervasive and seamlessly integrated with everyday life. This sea change is driven by the increasing ability of tiny computing platforms to connect people and things to the Internet-the Internet-of-Things (IoT) [1] -enabling transformative applications ranging from health-care [2] , [3] to preventing counterfeiting [4] , [5] . Despite the magnitude of possibilities, the basic architecture of those IoT devices are quite similar; microcontrollers, transceivers, sensors, batteries, and sometimes, actuators are coupled with the most important component, the application specific software or more simply 'code' which endows the 'Things' with the ability to communicate with other parties and fulfill interactive tasks [6] - [8] .
More recently we have seen the emergence of tiny computing platforms in the form of highly resource constrained and intermittently powered batteryless devices that rely only on harvested RF energy for operations; best exemplified by Computational Radio Frequency Identification (CRFID) devices such as WISP [9] , MOO [10] and commercial devices from Farsens [11] . The benefit of batteryless devices arises from: i) the removal of expensive or risky maintenance, for example, when devices are deeply embedded in reinforced concrete structures or tasked with blood glucose monitoring or pacemaker control [12] ; ii) the reduction in the cost of devices; and iii) the potential for an indefinite operational life. However, a significant challenge materializes from the need to, specifically, patch, update or reprogram the application specific software in the form of firmware without the supervisory control of an operating system; to do so, a physical connection to a device is required. Unfortunately, a wired connection not only negates the benefit of the battery-free feature and makes the process unscalable when potentially millions of devices need to be updated, but is a more acute problem in the context of deeply embedded devices, such as a blood glucose monitor, where physical access to the device poses practical challenges and risks to the end-user.
A. Problem
We define firmware update as the transfer of partial or entire executable code from the prover P to the non-violative memory of the CRFID device, referred to as the token T . The firmware update aims to, e.g., enhance CRFID device's computational or storage performance, impart new functionality, fix software bugs or address system compatibility. The firmware update is conducted either by physically connecting a download cable or in a wireless manner. Our work considers the more desirable but challenging secure wireless firmware update to eschew the cumbersome and, often impractical, cable-connected download method, especially when retrieving the device from its embedded location is required.
The fundamental problem of a wireless firmware update for CRFID devices was addressed in two recent approaches [12] , [13] ; both focused on transmission reliability, miniaturization of firmware code size, and energy efficiency. None of them addressed the difficult problem of assuring the security of wireless firmware updates, although Tan et al. [12] highlighted that secure wireless code dissemination remains the most urgent need to be addressed. This implies that both wireless approaches allow any party, irrespective of their trustworthiness, to remotely and wirelessly install code on a CRFID device. Consequently, malicious firmware injection from an adversary remains a direct threat that can lead to, for example, private information leakage such as health condition to unauthorized parties or the installation of malicious code in deeply embedded hardware such as a blood glucose monitor with devastating consequences for the victim. Therefore, this work aims to address the following questions:
• Is it possible to realize a secure and wireless code update mechanism without additional hardware components or devices? • Can we develop an update protocol compliant with current communication protocols to ensure translation into practice? • Can we securely update firmware under resource constrains and intermittent powering, as illustrated in Fig. 1 [14] ). The data was generated from a CRFID device 50 cm away from a 9 dBic antenna energized by an Impinj R440 RFID Reader, as described in [12] . Addressing the research questions above require overcoming a number of challenges. We briefly outline the key challenges below:
Typical operation
• Receiving and writing firmware to non-volatile memory (NVM) by a token requires considerable amount of energy [15] when operating on harvested power, even without taking the secure update mechanism into consideration. Battery-free CRFID transponders harvest energy from incident radio waves and the available energy is further influenced by a range of factors such as propagation path loss from the the radio source to the transponder and shadowing effects created by intervening objects along the radio wave propagation path. Hence, devices that operate on harvested power, such as CRFID transponders, are always constrained by energy and computation capability as illustrated in Fig. 1 . Therefore security must be realized under severe energy and computational resource limitations of a token. • Frequent state loss-as illustrated in Fig. 2 -results from interruptions to powering and the transient nature of power availability [12] . This is especially problematic when updating executable code. Careless handling of state loss may lead to unrecoverable firmware corruption or leave the token vulnerable to attacks [16] . Therefore, a firmware update mechanism should be robust even under state loss. • Security mechanisms rely on secure storage of keys. Traditional key storage methods in NVM require expensive memory technologies such as EEPROM or Flash memory not compatible with low cost standard CMOS processes. In addition, NVM storage is vulnerable to physical attacks without expensive protection, for example, protective coatings and active tamper sensing circuity requiring batteries. Therefore, a secure key storage method without additional hardware overhead, modifications and costs is highly desirable. • A secure update protocol design has to overcome the common difficulty of transferring large chunks of data to a transponder over narrow bandwidth wireless channels while still being compliant with existing standards and interface protocols for communicating with devices. Standards compliance will not only ensure successful adoption in practice but also interoperability with existing technologies.
B. Contributions
Our work takes the first step towards secure code dissemination for resource constrained and intermittently powered CRFID devices through a systematic approach that combines theory and judicious cryptographic engineering. We summarize the contributions of our work below and defer comparison of prior work to Section IV.
• A first secure wireless firmware update protocol: SecuCode is the first secure wireless firmware update or reprogramming method for CRFID devices to prevent malicious firmware injection attacks. • Lightweight physically obfuscated key derivation mechanism: We develop a key derivation mechanism using a physical unclonable function (PUF). A PUF converts hardware instance specific random variations such as gate and wire delays of circuitry to a binary value. In particular, we take advantage of the random stat-up state of intrinsic Static Random Access Memory (SRAM) on microcontrollers to extract a key material on the fly without extra hardware overhead and modifications. The key derived from such an SRAM PUF is therefore: i) intrinsically tamper-resistant (unclonability) compared to a permanently stored key in non-volatile memory; ii) unique, through the hardware instance specific nature of SRAM cells startup state; iii) unpredictable, through the physical randomness leading to random startup states of SRAM cells; and iv) never stored permanently in NVM as it is derived on the fly and discarded after usage. Our contribution here is to address the challenges faced in realizing a lightweight, reliable and secure key generator using an on-chip SRAM PUF on a resource constrained device. • Complete end-to-end design 1 : We demonstrate an end-to-end design from firmware compilation to a successful firmware update process supported by a power-aware execution model on a CRFID token to manage the transient nature of power availability. We develop a tool (SecuCode App) to update firmware as well as conduct a complete end-to-end implementation and evaluation on a resource-constrained and intermittently powered CRFID device. • Standards compliance: SecuCode firmware update protocol is fully standards compliant: i) we implemented SecuCode over the EPC C1G2v2 air interface protocol-ISO/IEC 18000-63:2015-and commonly used by modern Radio Frequency Identification technology, including CRFID devices; and ii) given the specific Texas Instruments (TI) ultra-low power micro controller employed by CRFID devices, we implement our bootloader for a CRFID device based on TI's recent framework for wireless firmware updates-MSP430FRBoot [17] -to ensure a standard tool chain for compilation and update of new firmware whilst taking advantage of the features supported by MSP430FRBoot. • Public code and data release: We provide the complete end-to-end solution, including the SecuCode App source code, and research data collected on 21 devices to support future research in the field. The released material is available from [18] .
C. Paper Organization
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II presents a brief background on CRFID system protocols and physical key derivation from a PUF. In Section III, we present the SecuCode protocol. Section IV discusses related work. We conclude our work in Section V.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. An Overview of CRFID System Protocols Fig. 3 illustrates a networked RFID system where the RFID reader resides at the edge of the network and connects to multiple antennas to communicate with long range RFID devices such as CRFID tags. The communication protocol between an RFID transponder operating in the UHF (Ultra High Frequency) range is governed by the widely adopted ISO-18000-6C-also known as the EPCglobal Class 1 Generation 2 version 2 (C1G2v2) air interface protocol or simply EPC Gen2 protocol henceforth. While communication between a CRFID device and the reader takes place using the EPC Gen2 protocol, the reader network interface described by the Low-Level Reader Protocol (LLRP) must be used by a host machine to communicate with a reader. Therefore, to realize a practicable solution, a secure code dissemination protocol must be implemented over the EPC Gen2 protocol where communication with readers must employ LLRP. Hence, a wireless firmware update process involves sending data from a host machine to a CRFID tag through a secure channel. This requires communication between three separate entities: i) the host machine; ii) the reader; and iii) the CRFID transponder.
The following steps are used to communicate with a CRFID device, or in general any EPC Gen2 protocol compliant transponder:
• Host to Reader. An application on the host machine constructs LLRP commands to build an ROSpec and AccessSpec to control the reader and transmits these specifications to a reader. • Reader to CRFID. As part of the anti-collision algorithm in the media access control (MAC) layer, the reader must first singulate a CRFD device and obtain a handle, RN 16. Singulation is achieved as part of the inventory operation to discover RFID devices in the powering and reading range of a reader. Inventory is performed through a combination of Query, QueryRep, and QueryAdjust commands. At the start of the inventory cycle the reader transmits a Query command, this notifies any devices in range of the beginning a new inventory session. Each device then selects a random slot counter between zero and an upper value, Q, defined by the Query command. If the selected slot counter is zero, then the tag backscatters its handle, RN 16, to the reader. If the slot counter is greater than zero, then the tag waits for a QueryRep or a QueryAdjust command. On receiving a QueryRep, the tag decrements its slot counter and backscatters a response as previously described if the resulting counter value is zero. On receiving a QueryAdjust, the tag adjusts the Q value and regenerates its slot counter. A singulated transponder can subsequently be queried using a range of Access commands such as BlockWrite used to write data to a transponder memory. Our approach is to realize a standard compliant secure firmware update protocol and therefore we design our secure firmware update protocol over the EPC Gen2 protocol. Consequently, the firmware update process will occur after signulating the target transponder and employ Access command specifications in EPC Gen2 protocol.
B. Physically Obfuscated Key Derivation
In our wireless firmware update method, the security of the communication between a reader and a CRFID device and the integrity of the firmware is dependent on the secure storage of a private key on a CRFID device. A physical unclonable function (PUF) is a cost-efficient security primitive to derive a volatile physically obfuscated key on demand for resource and power limited devices. Therefore, we first provide a brief overview of a PUF. Then the reverse fuzzy extractor is introduced to realize secure and lightweight key derivation from slightly noisy PUF responses-the key material.
1) Physical Unclonable Functions: A PUF reacts with an instance-specific response (output) by exploiting manufacturing randomness when it is queried by a challenge (input) [19] . It is widely employed for cryptographic key generation and lightweight authentication applications, including low-end resource-constrained devices [20] - [22] . In this paper, we exploit the on-chip SRAM to act as a PUF. Notably, the SRAM PUF is an intrinsic PUF; i.e. the realization of the PUF does not require a custom design, additional chip area overhead, or hardware modifications [23] , [24] . Typically one single SRAM cell consists of two cross-coupled inverters functioning as a latch. The initial power-up state of each SRAM cell is random but reproducible [25] , thus, the power-up pattern of bits generated from an SRAM memory-referred as an SRAM PUF-can be viewed as a unique identifier. In such a PUF, the address of the SRAM cell acts as the challenge, the initial power-up state-'1'/'0'-acts as the response. However, use of SRAM PUF response as key material is challenged by inconsistent regeneration of response bits and potential response bias. We address these challenges in our lightweight key derivation method.
2) Reverse Fuzzy Extractor: PUF response regeneration is noisy as it is vulnerable to fluctuations in environmental conditions such as thermal noise and power supply and temperature variations. Thus, PUF responses can not be directly used as a key and requires error correction to rectify flipped response bits (errors) in relation to a reference response. In this case, a fuzzy extractor (FE) is usually deployed to derive a key by using helper data to correct regenerated responses at a later time.
A fuzzy extractor FE is described by two algorithms-see detailed descriptions in Section III-A: i) key generation or enrollment algorithm FE.Gen; and ii) key reconstruction algorithm FE.Rec.
However, the computational complexity of computing the helper data by FE.Gen and the key reconstruction by FE.Rec using the helper data is asymmetric. Therefore, in this paper, we construct a reverse fuzzy extractor [21] to ensure the lightweight FE.Gen implementation is on the resource-constrained CRFID device while the computationally expensive FE.Rec is implemented at the resource-rich host.
In general, a reverse fuzzy extractor's FE.Gen function is implemented on the device. Then the device applies a random challenge, c, sent by a server or verifier to obtain a noisy response, r', from an on-device PUF and uses the generator function FE.Gen to compute helper data, h for this noisy response output. The helper data generated and a hash of the response r' is communicated to the server. Subsequently, the server uses the helper data to reconstruct the response r' using a securely stored response r evaluated during a secure provisioning phase for the the given challenge c [21] .
III. SECUCODE: PROTOCOL DESIGN
We ease into the design of the protocol by first describing the notations used in the protocol followed by a formal description of the SecuCode protocol.
A. Notations
The notations used in the rest of the paper, following that in [20] , is described below:
• A bold lowercase character is used for a vector, for example, a challenge applied to a PUF is c. A bold uppercase character is used for a set, for example, a challenges set C, where c ∈ C. • True Random Number Generator TRNG outputs a truly random number when invoked. • physical unclonable function PUF takes a challenge c as input and reacts with a corresponding response r as output, where r ← PUF(c). • Symmetric Key Primitive SKP has two algorithms: SKP.Enc and SKP.Dec where SKP.Enc takes an input plaintext m and encrypts it with a secret key sk to produce the ciphertext ct as an output, where ct←SKP.Enc(m, sk). SKP.Dec performs the decryption function, where the plaintext m can be recovered from the ciphertext by using the same sk as m←SKP.Dec(ct, sk). • Fuzzy Extractor A fuzzy extractor FE is defined by two functions: key generation algorithm FE.Gen and key reconstruction algorithm FE.Rec. The FE.Gen takes a variable z as input and produces key sk and helper data h. The FE.Rec algorithm recovers the sk assisted with h by taking the z as input if the Hamming distance HD(z, z ) is sufficiently small, i.e. HD(z, z )≤ t with t a fixed parameter-correctness of reconstruction guarantee. If HD(z, z )≤ t for input z and min-entropy [26] of z ≥ |h|, the fuzzy extractor provides key sk that is statistically close to a uniformly distributed random variable in {0, 1} |sk| although helper data h is exposed to an adversary-security guarantee. Fuzzy extractors are generally built with an error-correction method [27] .
B. Adversary Model
In this paper, our focus is on the communication between the Reader and the CRFID transponder or Token T . We assume that the communication between a Host and a Reader is secure using standard cryptographic mechanisms for securing communication between two parties over a network [5] ; hence a Host computer and a Reader are considered as a single entity, the Prover, denoted as P.
There is no previous CRFID firmware update protocol that considers security. Therefore, no existing adversary model has been reasoned. In this initial secure wireless firmware update investigation, we follow a relevant adversary model and assumptions in PUF-based authentication protocols designed for resource-constrained platforms [20] , [21] .
Notably, a wireless firmware update of a CRFID device is only possible after: i) the commissioning of the device whereby an immutable program called the bootloader is installed on the device; and ii) the prover P has enrolled-extraction and secure storage of-SRAM PUF responses in a secure environment using a one time access wired interface. We assume that the wired interface is disabled after the installation of the bootloader and enrollment of the PUF responses. In other words, the adversary A cannot directly access the SRAM PUF responses, only the immutable bootloader maintains this access at power-up and for a very short duration of time. After the commissioning of the device, both a trusted party and the adversary A must use the wireless interface for installing new firmware on a token.
Subsequent deployment of a token T will place it in an adversarial environment where only the prover P remains trusted. We assume that the attacker A can eavesdrop on the communication channel, isolate the CRFID transponder from the system and carry out a man-in-the-middle attack and forward tampered information from P to T and vice versa. Further, following the assumptions in [20] , within the adversarial environment, the adversary A may obtain any data stored in the NVM of the devices. However, as in [20] , the adversary A cannot mount implementation attacks against the CRFID, nor gain internal variables stored in the registers, for example, using invasive attacks and side-channel analysis. Similar to other adversarial models, we do not consider Denial of Service (DoS) attacks because, in practice, it is not possible to defend against an attacker that, for example, disrupts or jams the wireless communication medium [28] .
C. SecuCode Protocol
SecuCode protocol described in Fig. 4 relies on the simplicity of transmitting the firmware in plaintext and assumes the adversary A can gain full knowledge of the firmware-this is consistent with our adversary model which assumes that an adversary can read the contents of the NVM of a CRFID device. Our focus is to prevent malicious code injection attacks.
The SecuCode protocol is designed to be implemented over the EPC Gen2 protocol. In particular, we employ the recently defined extended Access command features for supporting future security services on RFID transponders. Consequently, firmware update initializations employs TagPrivilege and Authenticate while downstream data transmissions in SecuCode are carried out by employing the EPC Gen2 protocol specification of BlockWrite and SecureComm commands. The SecureComm command specification allows the encapsulation of other EPC Gen2 protocol commands, such as the BlockWrite but the payload is encrypted. Hence, we employ the SecureComm command to transport the encrypted data. We employ BlockWrite command to write firmware to a memory space, or download area, allocated and managed by the bootloader on a CRFID transponder. Although the specification of TagPrivilege, Authenticate and SecureComm commands are defined in the EPC Gen2 protocol, it is important to mention here that these commands are yet to be supported on CRFID transponders and this also constitutes one of the tasks in this study.
The key phases in our proposed SecuCode protocol are summarized below:
• Prover initialization phase in a secure environment: This phase is carried out in a secure environment. A publicly known unique ID string is stored in a token's NVM. The prover P enrolls in a database DB the ID string of the target token T as well as the PUF challenge-response pairs (CRP) from the PUF (also known as the enrollment phase [19] ). The bootloader, immutable program stored in a write protected memory space, is installed on the token T by the prover P and, subsequently, the physical interface to the T is disabled. The bootloader is responsible for the SecuCode protocol implementation on the token. • Firmware update phase in a potential adversarial environment: In this phase, for each code dissemination session, there will be a compiled firmware at the prover P ready to be transmitted along with a setup profile which describes the size of the firmware, starting memory address and the encryption method for the token T . In particular, the following occurs: i) lightweight physically obfuscated key derivation on the token T and the subsequent transmission of the token generated random challenge seed c and helper data h to the prover P; ii) firmware update which includes the wireless transfer of firmware to the token and the authentication-establishing the veracity of the firmware on the token T to accept/abort the firmware update issued by the prover P-and update of firmware on the token. We elaborate on these stages below. 1) Lightweight Physically Obfuscated Key Derivation: After the token T harvests adequate RF power from the prover P, a nonce is generated for use in the firmware update session, meanwhile a random number c i is generated as the seed challenge. The challenge c i can be viewed as a challenge seed that determines starting index into a byte level address in a block of highly reliable and unbiased SRAM PUF cells; for a detailed discussion please refer to Section ??. These responses are subsequently readout; r i ←PUF(c i ). We propose performing a conditional firmware update based on evaluating the on-chip temperature prior to the key derivation phase since response reliability of SRAM PUFs are more sensitive to changes in temperature than supply voltage. Immediately following the response extraction, the TEMP() function sets an over-temperature flag (TOF) if the in-built chip thermometer reports a temperature outside of a legal range. Setting an over-temperature flag (OTF) will result in the token T aborting the key derivation phase. As a consequence of limiting the operational temperature under which PUF response measurements are obtained, we significantly reduce the key failure probability and the computation burden of the subsequent key generation while meeting error correction and security bounds-Section ??.
A token T operating under a legal temperature range (0 • C to 40 • C chosen in this work) will execute the private key sk i derivation and helper data h i generation as (sk i ,h i )←FE.Gen(r i ). The private key sk i is used in the following firmware update process and only retained in the SRAM on the token T for the duration of the protocol session and discarded: i) at the completion of a session; or ii) during a power loss event.
2) Firmware Update: The ID of the token T is checked by the prover P to select the target token and once the target is confirmed to be visible to the prover and is singulated, the prover P can employ Access commands Authenticate, BlockWrite and SecureComm-see Figure 3 for an illustration of the behavior of the EPC Gen2 communication protocolto execute the firmware update. We describe the update phase below.
The prover issues an Authenticate command to deliver setup parameters, which contains the target user code block ID-firmware storage location-and the size of the new firmware, to the token. The token responds with the nonce, c i along with h i back to the prover if the requested memory space is confirmed available at the token; otherwise, the token replies with an error code and aborts the firmware update and triggers a power-on reset. The prover P reconstructs the private key sk i through sk i ← FE.Rec(r i , h i ); here, r i is the enrolled response corresponding to c i . Now the prover P and the token T have a shared private key.
Notably, the firmware cannot generally be sent to the token T in a single transaction. The EPC Gen2 protocol implies a limitation on the length of a payload string to 255 words, which is inadequate to encapsulate a complete practical CRFID firmware [12] . Therefore, we partition the firmware input into n chunks {f irmware 0 , f irmware 1 , f irmware 2 , ..., f irmware n } and transmit sequentially indexed chunks {seq 0 , seq 1 , ..., seq n } to the token T using the BlockWrite command. Here, seq i indicates the relative offset of firmware chunk f irmware i .
The token T must validate the authenticity of the prover P and the integrity of the firmware prior to applying a firmware update. First, S is computed by the prover P using a one-way function (OWF) where S ←OWF(f irmware nonce). Second, the prover P encrypts S through x ←SKP.Enc(S , sk i ) and sends the x to the token T . The token T decrypts x to obtain S ←SKP.Dec(x, sk i ) and computes S = OWF(f irmware nonce) locally to compare S and S . If S and S match, the token T accepts and applies the firmware update. Success of a firmware update is signaled to the prover P by the token backscattering an ACK. This process ensures:
1) The integrity of the received firmware at the token T . Any corruption or mutation will lead to the failure of the integrity check on the token owing to the one-way function OWF and subsequent discarding of the firmware.
2) The authority of the prover P. Only the prover P is able to issue x because the SKP.Dec in the token T and SKP.Enc in the token P must utilize the same key sk i and only the trusted prover P has the key material to generate the private key sk i .
IV. RELATED WORK AND DISCUSSION
For emerging battery-free computing devices such as CRFID platforms including WISP [9] , MOO [10] and Farsens Pyros [11] , firmware updates are usually done with a wired programming interface; for example by way of a JTAG [10] interface or a Serial interface [29] . The main difficulties that hinder CRFID platform to be reprogrammed using a wireless method are: i) the transiently powered nature where encountering power failures are highly likely [12] ; ii) reprogramming code memory such as FLASH that require the device attaining an adequate voltage level from harvested power [15] ; and ii) the lack of supervisory control of an operating system for managing a devices' tasks [30] . We have seen recent efforts to bring wireless reprogramming to CRFID transponders [12] , [15] , [30] , [31] , however, to the best of our knowledge, SecuCode is the first work to resolve the requirement for security for wireless code dissemination for intermittently powered passive CRFID devices. Therefore, in the following we review studies to: i) develop a bootloader and modify application behavior; and ii) progress towards developing on-the fly wireless firmware update methods.
A. In-application behavior modification
An early version of a bootloader for a CRFID platform, Bootie was proposed by Ransford in [30] . Bootie was designed to accept two (or more) firmware and cross-compile them into one executable to be preloaded onto a CRFID transponder. The compiled firmware was then downloaded and tested on Olimex MSP430-H2131 minimum system board. The author showed that the Bootie could be used as a basis for wireless firmware updates. However, as a proof-of-concept, Bootie only enables the platform to execute pre-loaded firmwares one-by-one and did not allow responding to user demands nor operating conditions to determine the switching between firmware.
The FirmSwitch scheme was later demonstrated in [31] to offer firmware flexibility for CRFID transponders. This approach allowed a user to switch between pre-loaded firmware instances on a CRFID platform using downstream commands to the CRFID transponder. However, FirmSwitch was not developed to support wireless firmware updates.
B. Wireless code dissemination
More recently, the Wisent method in Tan et al. [12] , R 2 and R 3 method in Wu et al. [13] , [15] demonstrated a robust wireless firmware update method for CRFID transponders using WISP platforms. In particular, R 3 was implemented on three different types of CRFID transponders. Subsequently, in Stork, Aantjes et al. [32] proposed a fast Multi-CRFID wireless firmware transfer protocol that involves ignoring the RN16 handle sent form an RFID transponder (i.e. the tags still save the downstream data even if their handle does not match the one specified by the reader). Stork enables an RFID Reader to simultaneously program multiple CRFID devices in the field to reduce the time to update multiple devices. Although these works achieved on the fly wireless update of firmware along with a bootloader design, none of wireless firmware update approaches address the issue of security and the trustworthiness of the prover, therefore, malicious firmware injection remains an open issue.
In late 2016, Brown and Pier from Texas Instrument (TI) presented an application port [17] extending TI's previous work, MSPBoot [33] . In this work, wireless updating was demonstrated in two examples; using UART or SPI bus to interconnect an MSP430 16-bit RISC microcontroller and a CC1101 sub-1GHz RF transceiver. The enhanced bootloader design supported: i) application validation; ii) redirecting interrupt vectors; and iii) code sharing via preconfigured callbacks. Additionally, a dual image failsafe mechanism is introduced; here, before the application in executable area is overwritten, the new image would be verified in a download area. Therefore any interruption in communication would not affect the function of the device. However, like other bootloaders and wireless firmware update methods, security is not considered.
V. CONCLUSION
We have presented the first secure wireless firmware update scheme, SecuCode, for resource-constrained and intermittently powered CRFID devices. We derive a volatile secret key on demand and discard it after usage to remove the difficulty of permanent secure key storage in NVM. Our SecuCode protocol only allows an authorized party to perform a wireless firmware update and does not require any hardware modifications whilst being standards compliant.
